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Usesof Funds
THE ability of the consumer instalment financing agencies to vary
the supply of funds in accordance with their needs during 1929-41
enabled them to keep a high proportion of their funds actively
employed in loans throughout years both of prosperity and depres-
SiOn.' Commercial banks, on the other hand, particularly those that
experienced a large increase in deposits. found it increasingly diffi-
cult to maintain a large proportion of total assets in the form of
loans.
In the aggregate, loans have never constituted as large a pro-
portion of total assets for the commercial banking system as for
the specialized lending agencies because banks operate under legal
requirements to maintain specified reserves, generally in the form
of cash or deposits with other banks. Moreover, at any one time a
commercial bank's balance sheet reflects a certain amount of "float"
—cash items in process of collection—which serves to inflate the
figures of total assets and thus reduce the loan proportion. Never-
theless, throughout most of the period 1929-41, commercial banks'
loans were notably lower in dollar amount, as well as in percentage
of total assets, than they had been in the previous decade. Most
banks therefore entered the consumer instalment financing busi-
ness, but it still constituted only a small proportion of their lend-
ing activity by the end of the period.
Cash holdings of consumer instalment financing agencies, other
than credit unions, constituted a small—almost negligible—pro-
portion of assets. In commercial banks they were relatively large at
the beginning of the period, and a sizable proportion of the
1Inthis discussion the term "loans" refers to credit receivables, regardless of whether
they consist of direct loans or of discounted sales finance paper. The term will
always refer to the net amount of outstanding receivables after the deduction of any
reservesfor bad debts or valuation allowances. Except where specificallystated,
however, no deduction is made by offsetting hypothecateci deposits against the loans.
The amount of loans includes the finance charge or the discounted interest, except
in regard to personal finance companies and credit unions; in regard to banks
discounted interest may or may not be included.
5556 COMPARATIVE OPERATING EXPERIENCE
subsequent increase in their total assets represented cash assets—
vault cash, reserves with other banks including required reserves,
and cash items in process of collection.
The low proportion of cash held by consumer instalment financ-
ing agencies can be attributed to two factors:first, they needed
cash only for current and new business operations, in contrast to
commercial banks, which were subject to substantial withdrawals
of funds upon demand; and second, they had an extremely high
turnover of funds, since every month a typical company was re-
paid from one-tenth to one-fifteenth of its outstanding loans. The
regularity of this flow of repayments permitted the company to
operate on a very small reserve of cash in excess of its actual till-
money needs.
Among the specialized agencies the proportion of funds invested
in securities fluctuated considerably during the period under review
but in general remained relatively unimportant, whereas among
commercial banks in the aggregate securities became a more im-
portant component of total assets than loans. This increase in
securities consisted almost entirely of holdings of United States
Government obligations which represent bank financing of the
federal deficit incurred in promoting the recovery program and,
since 1939, the defense and war programs.
Only a negligible proportion of the total assets of consumer
instalment financing agencies and commercial banks was in a form
other than loans, cash or securities. The proportion was, in general,
highest for commercial banks, reflecting their tendency to acquire
the buildings in which they do business. Besides real estate, whether
used as a place of business or otherwise, these other assets included
furniture and fixtures, repossessions of automobiles or other chat-
tels, prepaid and unamortized expenses, and intangible items such
as goodwill.
In their asset distribution there is little evidence that size of
company made any material difference among the specialized agen-
cies. The reverse was true among commercial banks.
PERSONAL FINANCE COMPANIES
Because the dollar volume of loans of personal finance companies
showed little or no decline during the depression, these companies,
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high loan proportions of 80 to 90 percent of total assets
throughout the period. After the depression their loan volume ex-
panded rapidly; for companies included in the income tax sample,
loans in 1936 were 40 percent higher in dollar amount than they
had been in 1929.
For the two national companies, and for local companies included
in the income tax sample, the proportion of total assets invested
in securities trebled from 1929 to 1933. It is probable that some of
these companies could have decreased their short-term borrowings
—and thus avoided investing in securities—but preferred to con-
tinue the use of specific borrowed funds, once acquired, in view
of the difficulty in securing access to satisfactory credit facilities.
A number of personal finance companies included in the income
tax sample acquired, between 1929 and 1933, significant propor-
tions of taxable securities which they continued to hold in 1936.
Examination of their income tax returns reveals two interesting
developments: growing companies had organized subsidiaries to
engage in the same or similar types of business, and held their
securities; or, companies that were faced with a decline in demand
for loans had acquired a variety of common stocks, thus becoming,
to a limited extent at least, investment trusts.2
Cash proportions were materially higher for national and regional
personal finance companies than for local companies in most years
for which data are available. Even so, cash was rarely more than 10
percent of total funds and other assets were negligible. Percentage
distributions of total assets of the selected samples of personal
finance companies, 1929-41, are shown in Table 4,3
2Thesetendencies made it necessary to exclude these companies from the analysis
of income and expenses. See Appendix A.
M. R. Neifeld's estimate of the asset distribution of all personal finance companies
in the United States on December 31, 1936 reveals a sharply higher proportion of
miscellaneous assets and a slightly lower loan proportion than that shown in the
income taxorintheNational CreditOfficedata(Neifeld, Personal Finance
Comes of Age, New York 1939, p. 209). This discrepancy is due entirely to Neifeld's
inclusion in total assets of going-concern value, represented by cost of development
and cost of financing, amounting to 5.6 percent of total assets.
The Neifeld estimate was prepared from available data in reports of state super-
visory officials and, like its source material, is subject to two limitations:first, the
figures represent assets and liabilities reported for individual offices within each state,
rather than assets and liabilities of corporate entities; and second, since the state
regulatory agencies have as their objective the determination of rates of profitability
and "fair" rates of charge, their emphasis is placed on asset values allowed in the
preparation of a rate base rather than on book values. This accounts for the inclusion
S
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SALES FINANCE COMPANIES
During the depression the decline in the volume of loans of sales
finance companies was so drastic that despite their greater ability
to contract the use of short-term borrowed funds their loan propor-
tions fell off to a slightly. greater extent than those of personal
finance companies. For the companies included in the National
Credit Office sample, the low point in loan percentage was reached
in 1932. By 1936, however, both the dollar volume of loans and
the percentage of loans to total assets had increased to a greater
extent for sales finance than for personal finance companies. Table
5 gives percentage distributions of total assets of selected samples
of sales finance companies, 1929-41.
One would expect repossessions to be most frequent in the busi-
ness of sales finance companies, and to show the greatest increase
in periods when collections were difficult. It is the more surprising,
therefore, to find that the sales finance companies' proportion of
miscellaneous assets was so low, and that the dOllar amount de-
creased from 1929 to
4For companies included in the income tax sample this decrease amounted to 10
percent. It is necessary to point out that the income tax figures represent data for
• identical companies which filed reports in all of the three years under consideration.
Therefore the figures for miscellaneous assets, particularly those representing repos.
sessions, are not entirely representative of the operations of all such institutions,
since those companies which encountered serious difficulties in the early 1930's and
failed, or which sold their assets to other companies and liquidated, or which re-
organized and continued business under a different name, are not included in these
data. Companies not represented may be presumed to have shown less favorable
results, particularly with respect to the acquisition of repossessions, than those com-
panies that continued operations throughout the period.
of going-concern value, as a separate item, in the Neileld estimate.
For comparable reasons there are also differences between the distribution of assets
of the personal finance companies in the income tax sample and the hypothetical
distribution of assets prepared by the Russell Sage Foundation. This distribution sets
the amount of "necessary and useful" assets at 115 percent of loans, and assumes that
for the proper conduct of the personal finance business total assets would be dis.
tributed as follows: 87.0 percent loans; 4.4 percent cash, including securities;1.7
percent furniture and fixtures; 1.7 percent other tangible assets; and 5.2 percent cost
of development. The chief difference between the two distributions results from the
fact that the companies included in the income tax sample did not capitalize cost
of development and other intangibles to the extent that the formula assumes. When
adjustment is made for this factor, cash and securities combined, and loans, are in
line with the hypothetical percentages in 1929, but, not in 1933 and 1936, when the
income tax sample showed an increase in cash and securities. The discrepancy in
those years illustrates the inflexibility of the hypothetical distribution, which, by its
very nature, could not make allowance for the inability of personal finance com-



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































eUSES OF FUNDS 6i
The low proportion of repossessions may be explained in several
ways. On recourse, paper, sales finance companies were able to
transfer repossessions to the dealer, soth'at their own balance
sheets and operating statements were not affected. Some companies,
reluctant to show an increase in repossessions on their balance
sheets,sinceit might adversely affecttheir borrowing power,
charged the entire acquisition cost of the repossession to a reserve
for losses, and showed recoveries when the asset was disposed of.
Also, sales finance companies made strenuous efforts to dispose of
repossessions, sometimes by sale at auctions, or by transfer to sub-
sidiaries, which frequently disposed of the article in a community
in which the parent company did not operate. The dollar decrease
noted in total miscellaneous assets during 1929-33 probably re-
sulted, in part, from a decrease in net fixed assets, brought about
by an increase in the reserve for depreciation.
INDUSTRIAL BANKING COMPANIES
Although non-investment type industrial banking companies are,
in general, similar to personal finance companies in their sources
of funds and asset distributions, it is notable that their loan volume
fell off considerably during the depression, and failed to regain
its pre-depression level in 1936. Percentage distributions of total
assets of selected samples of industrial banking companies are shown
in Table
Loans of investment type industrial banks, whether calculated
in percent of assets or in terms of 1929 outstandings, fell off almost
as drastically as those of commercial banks during the depression
and only regained their pre-depression level in 1936. The inability
of industrial banks to maintain loan volume during the depression
is due to the fact that depositors in industrial banks did not with-
draw their funds to an extent comparable with the decline in de-
mand for suitable loans. The initiative for varying the supply of
funds did not rest with the institution, as in the case of the other
specialized agencies. In part, also, industrial banks required a
greater amount of liquidity than the other agencies because of
the uncertain stability of deposits.
The apparently lower loan proportion for insured industrial banks in 1936 than
for those included in the income tax sample is due to deduction of hypothecated






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































USES OF FUNDS 63
The tendency of investment type industrial banking companies
to engage increasingly in a general deposit banking business led
to a progressive shift in their cash requirements from those charac-
teristic of consumer instalment financing to those more typical of
banks of deposit. In 1929, practically all of the companies included
in the income tax sample reported cash holdings of less than 5
percent of total assets, but by 1936 one-third reported cash in excess
of 10 percent and another third reported cash between 5 and 10
percent of total assets. In 1936 insured industrial banks had cash
averaging about 9 percent of total assets; by 1941 cash had in-
creased to about 16 percent.
Industrial banks showed an average investment in securities
somewhat higher than that of the other specialized agencies but
sharply under that of commercial banks. A steadily increasing
number of investment type industrial banking companies included
in the income tax sample held tax-exempt securities over the period
1929 to 1933, though the amounts did not constitute a large pro-
portion of total assets. The figures for insured industrial banks
show higher securities proportions than those for noninsured com-
panies. These differences, highlighted in 1936 by separate tabula-
tions of these companies in the income tax sample, can be attrib-
uted to the greater degree to which the insured institutions were
taking on the characteristics of commercial banks. From 1938 to
1941, however, while the volume of their assets expanded, the
securities proportions of insured industrial banks declined.6
It was in investment type industrial banks that miscellaneous
assets constituted the smallest proportion of the total, although in
6Inthe asset distributions prepared from data of the American Industrial Bankers
Association, showing investment and non-investment type companies separately, cited
in National Bureau of Economic Research '(Financial Research Program), Industrial
Banking Companies and Their Credit Practices, by Raymond J. Saulnier (New York
1940) P. 69, securities proportions were somewhat higher, with loan proportions
correspondingly lower, than in the income tax tabulations, or in the tabulations of
insured bank data prepared by the FDIC. It may be assumed that the AIBA data
were based on consolidated reports for each company, whereas in the income tax
data the figures are not consolidated; in other words, holdings in subsidiaries appear
as securities. This difference in procedure could readily account for the small dis-
crepancies shown.
A tabulation of 64 insured and noninsured Morris Plan companies—most of which
are of the investment type—prepared from Polk's Bankers Encyclopedia for Decem-
ber 31, 1938, cited in Saulnier, op. cit., p. 68 shows an asset distribution similar
to that shown for insured industrial banks, when not adjusted for hypothecated
deposits.64 COMPARATIVE OPERATING EXPERIENCE
dollar amount they increased sharply from 1929 to 1933 in the
companies included in the income tax sample. This increase can
probably be accounted for by the expansion in activities and, in
some cases, by the acquisition of banking houses. The proportion
dwindled in the insured institutions with the expansion in their
assets after 1933.
FEDERAL CREDIT UNIONS
Federal credit unions, from 1934 to 1941, showed an ability to main-
tamalmost as large a proportion of total assets in the form of
loans as the other consumer credit agencies. This proportion, how-
ever, declined slightly but continuously during 1937-40, falling
from 81.5 to 77.8 percent, and dropping further during 1941 to
65.6 percent.7 The asset distribution of all reporting federal credit
unions, 1934-41, is presented in Table 7.
TABLE 7
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL ASSETS OF FEDERAL
CREDIT UNIONS, 1934—41, BY ASSET ITEMSa
Other
rear Loans Cash Securities Assets
1934 66.2% 33.1% b .7%
1935 • 77.3 21.8 b 9
1936 •80.2 17.9 b 1.9
1937 81.5 16.1 b 2.4
1938 80.7 15.4 3.5% .4
1939 79.5 14.0 6.2 .3
1940 77.8 13.5 8.2 .5
1941 65.6 17.8 15.8 .8
Based on data from U. S. Farm Credit Administration, Division of Finance and
Accounts; figures pertain to all reporting federal credit unions; the number for each
year will be found in Appendix Table B-i.
bAmountsnot available; included with other assets.
During the early years of their existence, federal credit unions
appear to have retained their surplus funds largely in the form
of cash, in anticipation of demands for loans from members. In
time, however, a good many credit unions seem to have decided
FrancisE. Wilcox, in A Statistical Study of Credit Unions in New York (Chicago
1940) pp. 80, 82, shows that at the end of 1937 state-chartered credit unions over ten
years old had a lower ratio of loans to total assets than credit unions less than ten
years old (68.4 compared with 78.5 percent).USES OF FUNDS 65
that their members' demand for loans would develop no more
rapidly than the influx of share capital from other niembers. As a
result, since stringent regulations govern credit unions' investment
of funds other than in loans to members, there was an increase in
investments in United States government securities, and even more
in insured shares of savings and loan associations.
By the end of 1940 the total investments of federal credit unions
amounted to 8 percent. of their total assets; by 1941 it had risen to
16 percent, probably as a result of a concerted demand that credit
unions invest all available funds in government securities and
keep their loans at a minimum. In assessing the advantages of this
procedure from the viewpoint of the war effort, it should not be
overlooked that such a development might eventually jeopardize
the whole credit union system and make it necessary for members
to turn to other, more expensive sources of loans.
COMMERCIAL BANKS
The drastic contraction which occurred after 1930 in the relative
loan volume of commercial banks is pictured in Chart VII, which
shows percentage distributions of assets of all commercial banks
from 1919 to June 1942. From 1900 to 1930 the loans of all national
banks fluctuated between 52 and 58 percent of total assets. After
1930 the decline was precipitous, to a low of 26 percent in 1936;
since then the figure has fluctuated narrowly between 24 and 29
percent, as total assets continued to expand.
The loan proportions of commercial banks in the aggregate, how-
ever, are necessarily weighted by those of the larger banks. In gen-
eral, the smaller banks had a relatively higher proportion of assets
in the form of loans. Over half of the 10,600 banks with average
deposits of less than 2 million dollars held loans in excess of 40
percent of total assets in 1940, whereas only six of the 132 banks
with average deposits of more than 50 million dollars held loan
proportions as high.8 It is this tendency toward a much smaller
8Seethe Annual Report of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation for 1940, p.
201. In each year from 1936 to 1941 the percentage of insured commercial banks that
had high loan proportions was larger than in the preceding year. Published figures
on loan proportions forallinsured commercial banks, 1938-41, and for insured
commercial banks not members of the Federal Reserve System, 1936 and 1938,
appear in the following Annual Retorts of the FDIC: 1936, p. 189; 1938, p. 235; 1939,
p. 187; 1940, P. 200; and 1941, pp. 168, 171. These published figures include banks
designated in this study as insured industrial banks.
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loan proportion among larger banks which results in a low figure
for the country as a whole when the average is computed from do!-
lar aggregates; the figure obta.ined is materially higher when the
ratios of individual banks are averaged.9
Since size of banking center and size of bank are interrelated, it
is not surprising that the percentage of banks in small towns hav-
ing a high loan proportion was larger than that of banks in large
CHART VII
USES OF FUNDS OF COMMERCIAL BANKS, l919_42a
Represents percentage distribution of total assets of all commercial banks. Based on
Annual Reports of the Comptroller of the Currency. For 1919-S4 and 1942 figures are
as of June 30; for 1935-41 they are as of June 30 and December 31.
cities. However, size of bank bore a closer relation to loan propor-
tions than did size of banking center. There was little apparent
relationship between size of banking center and the loan propor-
tion among banks of approximately the same size; on the other
hand, in centers of the same size, the loan proportion showed a
9Averagescomputed from ratios of individual banks were used throughout this
analysis because of the bias in favor of the relatively few large banks obtained from
averages based on dollar aggregates (less than 10 percent of the insured commercial
banks hold more than 80 percent of the assets).
PERCENT PERCENT
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consistent downward tendency with increases in size of bank. This
would indicate that it was the largest banks in specific centers,
rather than all banks in those centers, which had the greatest diffi-
culty in finding outlets enough for suitable loans, or which deliber-
ately acquired securities. These were probably also the banks that
showed the greatest growth in deposits, particularly in interbank
deposits; and doubt respecting the stability of such deposits may
have prompted them to retain an even larger proportion of assets
in liquid form than was held by other banks in the same centers.
Broad geographic differences in commercial banks' loan propor-
tions are indicated by the fact that banks in agricultural areas gen-
erally tended to hold a high proportion of total assets in the form
of loans. States in the midwest and south, generally considered
to be dominated by agricultural and extractive industries, showed
higher average loan proportions than states dominated by manu-
facture and trade.1°
With respect to cash proportions, conflicting tendencies were
shown during the years 1936-40, among banks of different sizes
located in centers of different size. In centers of less than 10,000
population the smaller banks held a higher proportion of cash
assets, and in centers of more than 10,000 the opposite was true.
Among banks of a given size, however, those in the smallest and
largest centers held a higher cash proportion than those in the
intermediate size centers. In the smaller centers, banks tend to
keep a larger proportion of till-money because they are at a greater
distance from facilities for replenishing cash; also, if they are not
members of the Federal Reserve System, they tend to keep a large
proportion of balances with correspondents. In the largest centers,
higher legal reserves make for retention of a higher proportion
of cash assets.
CONSUMER INSTALMENT LOANS OF COMMERCIAL BANKS
We have seen (Table 1) that the share of commercial banks in
total holdings of consumer instalment loans increased greatly after
1929, rising to over one-fourth at the end of 1941. Nevertheless,
consumer instalment loans continued to represent only a small
10Sincea state is not a homogeneous unit in its economic development, state aver-
ages are not an entirely satisfactory measure of such differences, but more accurate
measures are not readily available.68 COMPARATIVE OPERATING EXPERIENCE
proportion of total loans, and a much smaller proportion of total
assets, of insured commercial banks. At the end of 1941 their hold-
ings of such paper amounted to about 1.7 billion dollars, or 8 per-
cent of their total loans and discounts.1' The proportion varied as
markedly among individual banks as did the figure for total loans
in percent of total assets.
It is shown in Table 8 that while one-eighth of the insured com-
mercial banks reported no consumer instalment paper in 1941, more
TABLE 8
NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF INSURED COM-
MERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANKS, MID-YEAR 1941, BY
PERCENT OF CONSUMER INSTALMENT LOANSa
Consumer Irtstalment
Loans in Percent of
Total Loansb
CommercialBanks IndusirialBanks
Number Percent Number Percent
No cons. inst. loans 1,665 12.6% .. ..
Under 2.5% 1,941 14.7 .. ..
2.5—5 1,822 13.8 1 1.2%
5—10 2,989 22.6 .. .
10—15 1,758 13.3 .. .
15—20 1,147 8.7 .. ..
20—30 1,155 8.7 .. ..
30—40 412 3.1 1 1.2
40—50 191 1.4 4 5.0
50—60 76 .6 4 5.0
60—80 39 .3 15 18.8
80 or over 25 .2 55 68.8
ALL BANKS 13,220 100.0% 80 100.0%
Based on data from Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Cash depositories and
banks that submitted reports covering less than the full year's operations or whose
operations were materially affected by mergers during the year are not included.
bEachlevel is inclusive of the lower limit and exclusive of the upper.
than one-eighth reported such paper in amounts of 20 percent or
more of total loans. The proportion of total loans represented by
consumer instalment paper was almost three times as large for
11Whilethe proportion of consumer instalment loans to total loans showed a wide
geographic range, varying from 3 percent in Rhode Island to more than 17 percent
in Arizona and Oregon, no regular geographic pattern is evident. in general, the
proportion is higher for the banks in the western and southern than for those in
the eastern and northern states.OF FUNDS 6g
banks not members of the Federal Reserve System as for central
reserve city member banks—12.2 percent as compared with 4.3
percent.'2
in general, a commercial bank's strongest incentive in entering
the field of consumer instalment financing has been the failure of
business loans to increase with the volume of deposits. This might
suggest that the larger banks in the larger centers, those that had
experienced the greatest growth in deposits, would have had the
strongest incentive to enter the consumer instalment field. How-
ever, although the growth in banks' consumer loans was greatest
in the large centers, the large banks in those centers showed less
of an increase than did the smaller banks.'3
These tendencies with respect to holdings of consumer instal-
ment loans by banks of different size in centers of different size are
subject to wide variation, due probably to many factors, not all
reducible to statistical analysis. It may be pointed out that inter-
est rates on agricultural and commercial paper show a wide geo-
graphic variation, and in an area where high rates of return can
ordinarily be obtained on such loans there is less inducement to
seek consumer instalment paper than in an area where traditional
business and agricultural loans bring very low rates of return.
Highly industrialized areas, on the other hand, provide a greater
proportionate demand for retail instalment credit than agricultural
areas, where fewer potential borrowers are in a position to make
regular instalment repayments. A considerable proportion of the
loans of small banks in rural areas had some of the characteristics
of consumer instalment paper, but they cannot be regarded as such
in any strict interpretation, because repayment was not provided
for on a regular instalment basis.
On this latter point pertinent data are available for the years
1937-40, from a sample of 756 small banks, representing about 5
SeeFederal Reserve Bulletin (May 1942) p. 440. Figures on the retail instalment
outstandings of all insured commercial banks weie first available as of December 31,
• 1939, when these banks submitted the figures on a supplementary schedule to the
federal bank supervisory agencies; these figures are summarized, by states, in the
Federal Reserve Bulletin (June 1940)P. 526. More comprehensive data on consumer
instalment loans held by insured commercial banks have been available semi-annually
since December 31, 1940; these figures are summarized, by states, in the Federal
Reserve Bulletins and in Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Assets and Liabili-
ties of Operating Insured Banks.
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percent of all insured commercial banks.14 All of them earned mate-
rially higher rates of income on their loans than did other banks
in the same state, and they attributed their higher-than-average
income rates to the fact that a large fraction of their loans were
small in amount. Of those banks that gave some indication of the
dollar size of their loans all except a negligible proportion reported
average loans of less than $500.
Some of these loans were reported by the banks as consumer
instalment paper; but whether or not they were so reported, they
appeared to be very similar in character to the usual cash loan
extended by consumer instalment financing agencies, in respect of
size of loan, security, and character of the charges imposed. But
though to some extent they were made to farmers and local busi-
nessmen for business purposes, they did not provide for equal
instalment repayments at regular intervals. A large proportion of
the banks made loans to factory employees and other workers,
providing for complete repayment within short periods of time,
sometimes as short as 15 or 30 days.
WAR DEVELOPMENTS
How well the consumer instalment financing agencies will be able
to adjust themselves to drastic changes during the war period re-
mains to be seen. Cessation of the production of automobiles and
many other types of durable consumer goods has already created
severe problems for the sales finance companies. In the past this
type of agency had the most flexible sources of funds, and curtail-
ment of operations was followed rapidly by curtailment of out-
standing obligations. The decrease in the volume of retail instal-
ment business has now become so severe that sales finance com-
panies have taken additional steps to adjust their operations.
14Correspondenceundertaken in order to verify amounts reported as loan income,
1937-40, by individual insured commercial banks not members of the Federal Reserve
System resulted in a body of usable information with respect to the character of loans
and of charges. This sample consists of banks whose rate of income on loans, after
verification, remained higher than the average for their respective states. Most of the
banks included in the sample held total loans of less than $100,000, and were
located in towns of less than 2,000 population, in the southern and western states.
There were 26 of the banks, however, whose total loans amounted to $500,000 or more
(6 whose loans exceeded $1,000,000), and 24 that were located in centers with a
population of 50,000 or over. In this connection itis of interest that many country
banks, responding to an inquiry from the National Bureau in connection with an
earlier study, reported that all loans made by them were "personal" loans.USES OF FUNDS 71
Some of the smaller companies have announced their intention
of liquidating; others that had a substantial proportion of small
loan business have shifted over completely to that type of activity.
The larger companies, which had already developed other outlets
for funds, have been spurred to expand into additional channels,
such as the discounting of accounts receivable, making working
capital loans to companies with war contracts or subcontracts, and
even acquiring manufacturing or engineering subsidiaries engaged
in the war effort, or insurance companies. One large regional com-
pany has sold its receivables to a national company, and another
has been purchased by an affiliate of a large branch bank system,
some of its automobile receivables and offices being acquired by
the bank.
Figures for cash-lending agencies reveal that their loans also fell
off during 1941, and more drastically during 1942, after Regulation
W became effective. The decline was particularly acute among the
industrial banking companies and credit unions. The decrease in
loan volume among industrial banks has resulted in increased hold-
ings of United States government securities in an effort to keep
idle funds employed; and the same is true of credit unions.
On the other hand, a number of personal finance companies
have succeeded in sufficiently curtailing the amount of funds,
through the retirement of borrowings or of preferred capital, to
avoid the retention of large supplies of vital funds. A number of
personal finance companies have also been absorbed by other units,
including one large local company in the National Credit Office
sample.